RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
EXTRATERRrrORiAL APPLICATION OF THE UNITED STATES' TRADE
EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA: THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY'S CALL FOR AN END TO THE U.S. TRADE EMBARGO

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On November 3, 1993, the Forty-Eighth General Assembly of the United
Nations adopted a momentous resolution calling for the end of the United
States' trade embargo against Cuba.' In the historic vote, the United States
mission was overwhelmed by international support for the Cuban-proposed
resolution.2
In accepting the resolution, the United Nations brought a bitter debate
between the Cuban mission and the U.S. delegation to a close. The debate
began in the United Nations in 1991, but actually found its roots decades
earlier when the United States first imposed its embargo against Cuba in
1963.' The Cubans called for the United States to lift its embargo in the

NECESSITY OF ENDING THE ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL EMBARGO IMPOSED
By THE UNiTED STATES OF AMERICA AGAINST CuBA, G.A. Res. 48/16, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess.,
Agenda Item 30, U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/16 (1993).
The final resolution was the subject of much debate, requiring amendments to the original
language. See Cuba: Draft Resolution, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 30, at 1-2,
U.N. Doc. A/48/L.14 (1993) for the draft form of the resolution.
The resolution was required because of the United States' non-compliance with an earlier
resolution calling for a cessation of acts by any member nation which violated the U.N.
Charter. See Cuba: Revised Draft Resolution, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 39, at
1-2, U.N. Doc. A/47/L.20/Rev. 1 (1992), which was printed in its final form as G.A. Res.
47/19, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 39, U.N. Doc. A/Res/47/19 (1993).
2 Eighty-eight countries voted in favor of the resolution presented by the Cuban mission;
four voted against it; fifty-seven countries abstained. Forty-eighthGeneralAssembly GA/8580
Plenary 3 November 1993 48th Meeting (AM) Assembly Urges All States to Refrain from
Applying Laws and Measures Affecting Sovereignty of Others, Federal News Service, Nov.
4, 1993, available in LEXIS, News library, FEDNEW File.
3 For a general overview of the history of the animosity between Cuba and the United

States, see MORRIs H.

MORLEY, IMPERIAL STATE AND REvOLUTION: THE UNITED STATEs

AND CUBA, 1952-1986 (1987).
The United States embargo was implemented, at least in part, in retaliation for Cuba's
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summer of 1991. 4 The Cuban mission finally prevailed with the passage of
Resolution 47/19, which called on nations to refrain from infringing on the
sovereignty of other member nations.5 The resolution was intended to urge
the United States to lift the embargo, or at least the provisions which seemed
to infringe on the sovereignty of Cuba and third nations.6 A year later, after
the United States had taken no action, the Cubans pushed Resolution 48/16
through the General Assembly. Like its predecessor, the resolution
specifically named the U.S. embargo in its title, and advocated lifting the
embargo.7 The months following the passage of the resolution have seen
little change in relations between Cuba and the United States,8 and no end
to the embargo is in sight.
The resolutions, in reality, have done little to alter the United States'
position. Cuba has successfully convinced the international community that
the embargo violates international law, and the U.N. resolutions were a
victory for Cuba. The victory, however, rings hollow for Cuba despite the
defeat suffered by the United States in the General Assembly vote. The
United Nations seems unprepared to enforce its resolution against the United
States, and no enforcement actions are pending. Absent a method of
enforcement, neither international law nor the United Nations can force the
United States to cease in its unyielding effort to cripple the Cuban economy.

nationalization of U.S.-owned property during and following Fidel Castro's communist
revolution in Cuba. RICHARD FALK, UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA
13-14 (1993).
4 Cuba sent a memorandum to the General Assembly entitled REQUEST FOR
THE
INCLUSION OF A SUPPLEMENTARY ITEM ON THE AGENDA OF THE FORTY-SIXTH SESSION,
NECESSITY OF ENDING THE ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL EMBARGO IMPOSED BY

U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess. at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/46/193 (1991).
' G.A. Res. 47/19, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 39, U.N. Doc. A/Res/47/19
(1993).
6 Id.
7 G.A. Res. 48/16, supra note 1.
8
The most significant development in Cuban-American relations has been Castro's lifting
of Cuba's emigration restrictions, which caused an exodus of refugees from Cuba bound for
Miami and a sudden reversal in the Clinton administration's open-door policy. This incident
has given rise to bilateral immigration talks between the United States and Cuba. Pascal
Fletcher, Sanctions Prove a Thorny Issue in US-Cuba Talks, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1994, at 6.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AGAINST CUBA,
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I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Trading with the Enemy Act: Foundations of the Cuban Trade Embargo
and the Cuban Democracy Act
The statutory and regulatory scheme of the United States' position on
Cuba is intricate and far-reaching. The statutory foundation of the embargo
is based on the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA).9 This law,
initially passed in the wake of World War I, gives the President the power
to authorize sanctions against any country in times of crisis. In 1950, for
example, President Truman declared a national emergency caused by what
he perceived as a growing Communist threat. President Kennedy based the
embargo against Cuba on the Truman proclamation of national emergency.
In the mid-1970s, Congress called for a revocation of the Truman proclamation, but the successful use of TWEA led Congress to allow all existing
measures under the Truman proclamation to remain in effect, thereby
preserving the embargo against Cuba.1° The regulatory and statutory
framework has continuously evolved since before the embargo began in
1963."'
In recent years, however, the international community has grown critical
of the United States' measures." When the Cuban mission introduced
Resolution 47/19 to the U.N. General Assembly, Cuba stressed that its
complaint stemmed from violations of international law by the United
States. 13 Specifically, the Cubans vigorously argued that the United States

9 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1988).
'0 FALK, supra note 3, at 92-93.
" For an excellent chronology of U.S. measures against Cuba, both statutory, regulatory,

and those enacted by administrative and executive fiat, see id. at 107-27.
12 Most analysts agree that Cuba's economy has reeled out of control, crushed by the
recent U.S. efforts to enforce the trade embargo and the collapse of the Soviet empire.
Andrew Zimbalist, Dateline Cuba: Hanging on in Havana,FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept. 22, 1993,
at 151. This phenomenon can probably be traced to the collapse of the Council of Mutual
Economic Assistance (COMECON), the economic program of Warsaw Pact countries. Soviet
bloc countries relied on COMECON for trade and financial assistance. Id. at 152.
" U.N. General Assembly Calls for End to U.S. Embargo on Cuba, AGENCE FREE
PRESSE, Nov. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, TAFP file.
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had applied its laws extraterritorially. 14 Cuba relied on the impact of these
U.S. statutes and regulations to gain support for its successful measures in
the United Nations.
Since President Kennedy's proclamation ordering the embargo against
Cuba, an evolving regulatory and statutory framework has modified the
embargo.15 The most recent enhancement of the embargo's impact on Cuba
was the adoption of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA).' 6 The
CDA was intended to "encourage" the Cuban government to begin a
transition to a democratic regime, and currently dictates U.S. policy toward

Cuba. 17
Section 1704 of the Act allows the President to apply sanctions against
any country which trades with Cuba." Such countries are restricted from
receiving any assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,'9 or
under the Arms Export Control Act.' The Cuban-trading countries are also

The Cubans were specific in their accusations, delineating twelve specific reasons that
the U.S. embargo was an extraterritorial application of its laws against Cuba. Annex to
14

Cuba's Specification of the ExtraterritorialReach of the United States Measures, U.N.

GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex, at 1-8, U.N. Doc. A/46/193/Add.7 (1991). The allegations
generally concerned the statutes and regulations which made it either difficult or impossible
for companies with American roots or affiliations located in third countries to trade with Cuba
without facing potential or actual consequences in the United States. 15 C.F.R. §§ 515.303,
515.329, 515.559, 774.1, 785.1, 779.1, 779.8, & 779.4 (1993); 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.204 &
515.306 (1993); 22 U.S.C. §§ 283(r), 2840), 286(aa)(1988), & 2370(a) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992). See also Jose de Cordoba, Cuba Woos CapitalistsFeebly, Driven by Need Instead of

Desire, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1991, at A13 (arguing that the United States had a general,
unwritten policy to coerce third countries into severing ties with Cuba).
For a summary of many of the regulatory and statutory measures to which the Cubans
have vehemently objected, see FALK, supra note 3. Falk illustrates the comprehensive
regulatory guidelines which have evolved over three decades and the extent of the U.S.
measures.
16 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (Supp. IV 1992). President Bush signed the bill into
law amid
much fanfare in a ceremony in the Cuban-American community in Miami. Remarks on
Signing the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2071 (Oct. 23,
1992). Furthermore, then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton announced his support for the
legislation before it was signed into law, also in a rally in the Cuban-American community
in Miami. Tom Fielder, Clinton Backs TorricelliBill, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 24, 1992, at IA.
17Mimi Whitefield, DemocracyAct Tries to Reach Cuban People: Embargo Just One
Side of the Coin, TDMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 23, 1994, at A28.
1 22 U.S.C. § 6003 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
'9 22 U.S.C. § 2151, et seq. (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
2o 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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ineligible for forgiveness or reduction of debt owed to the United States. 1
Section 1706 of the Act'2 is an even more restrictive aspect of the
embargo. In addition to suspending the grant of any license under 31 C.F.R.
§ 515.559 as of July 1, 1989,23 the Act also severely limits the ability of
vessels previously docked in Cuba to dock in the United States.24 Under
the Act, any vessel which docks in Cuba is prohibited from docking in the
U.Jnited States for 180 days thereafter.25
The goal of the CDA is to force Cuba to adopt a democratic form of
government. Section 1708 of the Act states that Cuba can regain Americanbased assistance by implementing "free and fair elections for a new
government."' There are a variety of other statutes which dictate American policy toward Cuba and were designed in some manner to end the

current regime in Cuba by inflicting economic stress on the country. 27
Although the U.S. measures had a forceful impact from the outset, Cuba
was able to insulate itself by relying on trade with Soviet-bloc nations.'
Only recently have the Cubans asserted arguments in favor of limiting the

U.S. sanctions against it.

2122 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).

22 U.S.C. § 6005 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
' See 22 U.S.C. § 6005(a)(1), which limited licenses under 31 C.F.R. § 515.559(b). The
regulation had previously allowed licenses for transactions between U.S.-owned or U.S.controlled entities organized under the laws of a third country and Cuba for a set of
specifically designated purposes.
24 22 U.S.C. § 6005(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
2' 22 U.S.C. § 6005(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
26 22 U.S.C. § 6006(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
27 See, e.g., Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101302, 104 Stat. 213, 244 (1990) (preventing funds for foreign assistance from being sent to any
country which provides military or economic assistance to Cuba); Food Security Act of 1985,
7 U.S.C. § 1446 (Supp. IV 1992) (directing the president not to allocate any U.S. sugar quota
to any country that is a net importer of sugar unless that country certifies that it does not reexport to the United States any Cuban sugar).
28 See supra, note 12.
2
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B. Extraterritoriality
Extraterritoriality is best defined simply. A country has free reign to
impose laws governing all events within its jurisdiction." A country may
not reach outside of the confines of its borders and impose its will on those

not validly under its jurisdiction.3"
According to the United States, the various measures against Cuba are a

valid exercise of sovereignty. 31

This position must be examined in

accordance with basic tenets of international law and agreements such as the
U.N. Charter and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAI').32
1. Principles of InternationalLaw
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations dictates the bases for
jurisdiction to prescribe laws. Sections 4023 and 403' outline the

" This tenet of international law, of course, assumes the absence of crimes against
humanity, which are generally thought to be violations of international law even if committed
exclusively within the borders of the offending country. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (1986).
30 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 401 (1986) (setting forth
limitations on jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate and enforce laws and regulations under
international law).
"' The United States has maintained this argument in every communication it has made
concerning the U.N. resolutions pertaining to its embargo against Cuba since August 21, 1991.
On that date, in a Department of State press release, the United States maintained that "the
U.S. embargo of Cuba is not an appropriate issue for discussion at the U.N. Every
government has the right and responsibility to choose the governments with which it wishes
to have commercial and political relations." U.S. Dept. of State Press Release, Aug. 21,
1991, cited in FALK, supra note 3, at 20.
32 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, OcL 30, 1947, 61 Stat. AS, 55 U.N.T.S. 188
[hereinafter GAIT].
33 Section 402 reads as follows:
§ 402- Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1)
(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place
within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within
its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have
substantial effect within its territory;
(2)
the activities, interests, status, or relation of its nationals outside
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requirements for such jurisdiction. Generally, and subject to limitations and
exceptions, a country can regulate matters which take place within its
territory, control the status of people or things within the territory, or control

as well as within its territory; and
certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals
that is directed against the security of the state or against a
limited class of other state interests.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 (1986).
3' Section 403 reads as follows:
§ 403-Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may
not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having
connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e. the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate
such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation
is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal,
or economic system;
(3)

(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.

(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in
conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state's
interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors, Subsection (2);
a state should defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly greater.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

§ 403 (1986).
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conduct outside the territory which affects the territory itself.35 It is vitally
important to note that the American system often views international law as
a part of American law.36
2. The Charterof the United Nations
Various provisions of the U.N. Charter hold signatory nations to the
principles of non-intervention and both expressly and implicitly forbid
extraterritorial application of laws which would thereby violate another
country's sovereignty. Article 1 of the Charter states that the purpose of the
United Nations is, inter alia, to promote international cooperation for solving
"problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character
. ...

37

Article 2 forcefully commands all member nations to respect the

sovereignty of all other member nations. 3' Article 2, paragraph 1 articulates
the necessity of sovereign equality of all members. 39 Article 2, paragraph
4 explicitly states that sovereignty shall not be abridged: "All Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state .... '"o
Article 2, paragraph 7 echoes the rationale of the Restatement, commanding
that the United Nations shall not "intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.... 4
The inherent difficulties of the embargo are apparent in careful analysis
of the Charter. The United States urges that its measures against Cuba are
of domestic concern, thereby falling outside U.N. domain. 42 Such an
argument brings the embargo under the rubric of Article 2, paragraph 7,

35 For a background of the supporting law for these measures, see the Reporter's notes
for each of these sections. Id. at §§ 402, 403.
36 U.S. CONST. art. VI. Article VI explicitly refers to treaties between nations as the law
of the land. Specifically, "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land' (emphasis added). Congress also
alludes to a superseding "law of nations" in Article I, § 8, when it dictates that "[the Congress
shall have power] [t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,
and Offences against the Law of Nations" (emphasis added).
37 U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, 3.
3 Id. at art. 2,
1.
3 Id.
40 Id. at art. 2, 4.
41 Id. at art. 2, 1 7.
42 U.S. Dept. of State Press Release, Aug. 21, 1991, cited in FALK, supra note 3, at 20.
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being "essentially within the [United States'] domestic jurisdiction. 4 3
Conversely, Cuba relies on Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 4, maintaining that
the United States is violating its and third countries' sovereignty with the
broad reach of its trading regulations.' The United Nations has elaborated
on the goals set forth in the Charter and has since established a series of

guidelines, adopting most of the accepted principles of international law.4'
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GATT was established to prevent member nations from mandating unfair
trading practices in the international market.' Several GATT provisions
are particularly germane to the United States' Cuban trade embargo.
Article 5 specifically reserves freedom of transit of international goods, no
matter where those goods originated.47 United States measures restricting
ports based on the goods carried by the docking ships, or even the prior
destinations of those ships, would seem to be in conflict with this provision.48 Article 11 proscribes any limitation or restriction upon the
importation of a product of another GATT member.49

43

U.N.

CHARTER art. 2, I 7.
at art. 2,1 1, 4.
The principles of international law are generally the same as those outlined in the

"Id.

Restatement. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. For a careful examination of
the provisions of international law adopted by the United Nations which are especially
germane to the discussion of the United States/Cuba trade embargo, see FALK, supra note 3,
at 238, citing G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 1883d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
"GATI, supra note 32. Over one hundred nations, including the United States and
Cuba, have joined GATT. Id.
7 Article 5 reads in part:
The freedom of transit through the territory of each contracting party, via
the routes most convenient for international transit [is guaranteed, and
said right applies notwithstanding] place of origin, departure, entry, exit,
or destination, or on any circumstances relating to the ownership of the
goods.
Id. at art. 5.
" See text accompanying note 16, supra, and text accompanying note 61, infra
(discussing provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992).
41Article I1 forbids "prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges
[upon products of other member nations]." GATT, supra note 32, at art. 11.
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Article 21 relieves signatories from applying GATT provisions to the
extent necessary to preserve the security interest of the regulating state."
A signatory nation, therefore, may be permitted to impose protectionist
measures if it feels that such measures are necessary to preserve its national

security.
C. United Nations Measures
The U.N. resolutions, which were overwhelmingly passed by the General
Assembly, made only vague references to the United States. Resolution
47/19, though naming the United States in its title, contained no specific

reference or direction in its body to steer U.S. policy."

The resolution

merely urged all states to avoid "laws and regulations whose extraterritorial
effects affect the sovereignty of other States and the legitimate interests of
entities or persons under their jurisdiction, as well as freedom of trade and
navigation.""
Resolution 48/16 re-emphasized the points made in 47/19 and noted, inter
alia, that Resolution 47/19 had not been implemented. 3 In a sense,
therefore, the November 1993 vote passing Resolution 48/16 was nothing
more than a reaffirmation of the call made a year before to condemn
extraterritorial application of a state's laws. However, even if the United

' Article 21 provides that a contracting party is not required to adhere to GAT
requirements to the extent that such non-adherence is necessary for "protection of its essential
security interests... in time of war or other emergency in international relations.... ." Id.
at art. 21.
The embargo was enacted under the Truman declaration of national emergency, which
would presumably bring the U.S. embargo under Article 21 of GATT. See text accompanying note 10, supra, for a discussion of the Truman declaration.
But see Statement of Robert S. Gelbard, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives (April 8, 1992) cited in FALK, supra note 3, at 137. Gelbard suggested that the embargo
against Cuba no longer exists because of a perceived security threat, but rather as an effort
to foster a political change within Cuba. He stated, "The United States has followed a policy
of isolating Cuba diplomatically and economically for three decades. We continue that policy
today in an effort to encourage a change to a democratic government in Cuba. To do
otherwise would only bolster the regime's repression at home and delay democratic reform."
Id. at 143.
5' G.A. Res. 47/19, supra note 5.
52 Id. The resolution drew its authority from the U.N. Charter. Id.
53 G.A. Res. 48/16, supra note 1.
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Nations had set out assertive standards and requested specific action from the
United States, the lack of any enforcement mechanism still would prevent the
resolution from having any practical impact.

III. ANALYSIS
Careful examination of the issues giving rise to the U.N. resolutions
calling for a change in the status of the U.S. embargo might shed light on
the legal and political issues motivating the United States and Cuba. Such
a one-dimensional analysis, however, overlooks the crucial changes sustained
by the Cuban people and the impact that the embargo has had on that
society. The resolutions were proposed by the Cuban delegation in response
to the failing integrity of the Cuban market, and the horrendous living
conditions in Cuba, both of which were largely the result of the embargo.'
Thoughtful afnalysis of the existing structure of international legal
principles leads to the conclusion that the U.S. policy" is unjustifiable
under international law. This examination shows further that the source of
the embargo, the Trading with the Enemy Act, is no longer applicable, and
that the embargo violates the standards set forth by the American Law
Institute in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, the U.N. Charter,
and GATT.
A. Trading with the Enemy Act: TWEA's Application in a Modem Setting
No longer able to rely upon the Soviet bloc either for raw materials or as
a trading partner,56 the Cubans are forced to abstain from some of the

' Cesar Chelala, Cuba's Citizens Suffer from U.S. Blockade, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR,
June 30, 1993, at 19.
-5 It should be noted that the American policy called into question here is not the

embargo, in toto; rather it is the measures instigated subsequent to the initial embargo which
have extraterritorial application, especially those which serve to penalize third countries or
entities therein for association and trade with the Cubans. Specifically called into question
are those U.S. measures delineated by the Cuban mission to the United States in Letter Dated
11 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations
Addressed to the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., at 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/46/193/Add.7 (1991), in addition to the measures called for by the United States Congress and the
President in CDA. See supra note 16 and accompanying text for further exposition.
- See Zimbalist, supra note 12.
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necessities of life that they had heretofore taken for granted. The impact
is felt throughout the nation. Many of the factories in Cuba only operate for
three hours a day because of the fuel shortage on the island.5" Much of the
Cuban population suffers from malnutrition, a malady also blamed on the
embargo. 9 The malnutrition has given rise to impaired vision and blindness in epidemic proportions.' The United States, however, has claimed
that it has not cut off humanitarian and medical aid to the island because the
Cuban Democracy Act makes reservations for purely humanitarian assistance
to Cuba.6 1
Absent the impending threat of Communist rule on a large portion of the
globe, the regime in Cuba appears to be little more than an anomaly. The
United States no longer claims that its embargo exists because of a
Communist threat. 62 Clearly, the motivating force of the embargo is to
foster political change within Cuba.63 There is little doubt that the objective of the embargo would be more quickly realized were the Cubans cut off
from all U.S. assistance. A loophole in CDA which allows for humanitarian
assistance to Cuba actually strengthens the Cuban government, because
revolutionary sentiment is curbed by the aid received from American
humanitarian sources. Furthermore, Castro has used the embargo to rally
support against the United States, blaming the United States for the
conditions within Cuba.'
Curiously, a more broad-reaching embargo appears to be necessary to
foster political change in Cuba. The difficulty with this and existing
measures imposed on the Cuban people is that the embargo violates basic
tenets of international law. Still, the United Nations and the international
57 See, e.g., Ricardo Chavira and David Marcus, Cuba: Communist Dream on the Brink
of Disaster, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 29, 1993, at A5, available in LEXIS, News library,
CALHER file.
58
Christine Tierney, Cuba: Cuban Workers Face Sharp Salary Cuts, REUTER TEXTLINE,
Oct. 31, 1991, available in LEXIS, News library, Reuter file.
" Id. at A5 (noting cases of malnutrition in Cuban children's clinics); Pascal Fletcher,
Cuba: Economic Problems Hit Sugar, Eggs Ration in Cuba, REUTERS, Jan. 6, 1993, available
in LEXIS, News library, Reuter file.
60 Cuba Eye Epidemic Traced to Diet Deficiency, REUTERS, Sept. 30, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News library, Reuter file.
6322 U.S.C. § 6004 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
6 Statement of Robert S. Gelbard, supra note 50.
63Id.
6 Anthony Boadle, U.S. Cuba Policy Said Helping, Not Hurting, Castro, REUTERS, Sept.
26, 1993, available in LEXIS, News library, Reuter file.
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community at large lack either the resolve or the facilities to end U.S.
oppression and extraterritorial application of its laws.
The most troublesome development in the embargo, which removes the
United States action even further from the valid exercise of sovereignty

under international law, is the admission that the Cuban Communist
government is no longer perceived as a threat.'
Most notably, this
removes the embargo from the GATT exception for national security, and
prevents the embargo from being applied under the Truman declaration of
national emergency created by a Communist threat. The embargo, therefore,
is not protected by TWEA and may be questioned under the originating
documents of the United Nations.
TWEA, the source of the embargo against Cuba, has no application in a

post-Cold War setting. TWEA applies to measures which are made in times
of national emergency.' The national emergency to which the embargo
with Cuba applied was the Communist threat during the Cold War. With the
dissolution of the Soviet bloc countries, the threat of Communist rule has all
but diminished entirely.67 Because the United States has voiced the

contention that the embargo is no longer maintained for national security
measures, TWEA no longer applies."

' Statement of Robert S. Gelbard, supra note 50.
6For a discussion of the evolution of TWEA's application to the Cuban trade embargo,
see text accompanying notes 9-28, supra.
SThe remaining Communist nations which are potentially a threat to the United States
are all suffering from problems which diminish that potential threat. North Korea is
preoccupied with the increased armament of South Korea. See David Callahan, "Saving
Defense dollars," Foreign Pol'y Sept. 22, 1994, p. 94 (discussing armament of both South
Korea and North Korea). Communist China has to quash internal insurgency and deal with
the potentially crippling problems of supporting an economy of over a billion citizens. James
Flanigan, "China in its Chrysalis Requires a Deft Touch by U.S.", LA. Times, June 5, 1954,
p. DI (discussing China's struggle to modernize its huge economy). To be sure, the Cubans
have been an agent of insurgency in the recent past, funding and actually sending ground
troops to Angola to assist in that country's efforts to overcome South African control of
Angola's southern neighbor, Namibia. UPI, "Cuba Pulls Last Troops out of Angola,"
available in LEXIS, UPI File. Cuba was also a supporter of the Sandinista movement in
Nicaragua, but with the waning of Soviet support, Cuba can no longer afford to support such
insurgencies abroad. Maria Newman, "A Former Cheerleader of Revolution Looks Back in
Indignation at Cuba," N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1984, § 4, at 7.
68 The language of TWEA explicitly permits economic sanctions in the realm of
international trade "during any... period of national emergency declared by the President."
50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b).
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B. Extraterritoriality
Careful consideration of the
how it is implemented reveals
laws beyond its borders. Such
violates the standards set forth
provisions of GATT.

nature of the U.S. embargo against Cuba and
that the United States' policy is to apply its
an extraterritorial application of the embargo
in the Restatement, the U.N. Charter, and the

1. Violations of the Restatement Standards
Measuring the actions of the United States and its necessary impact on
international sovereignty can easily be accomplished through a mechanical
application of the guidelines set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations sections 402 and 403.69
It is clear that the embargo does not regulate exclusively within the
borders of the United States.7 ° The crucial question, therefore, is whether
the embargo seeks to regulate conduct which has an effect within the borders
of the United States despite the extraterritorial application of those laws.
When the United States feared a legitimate communist threat, section 402(3)
was applicable, but in light of the United States' changing mandate toward
Cuba, it is unlikely that this exception continues to apply.
The United States argues that proper application of section 402(1)(c),
allowing regulation of U.S. nationals within and outside of U.S. territory,
justifies the United States' regulations of American companies' holdings
abroad. Such an argument, however, ignores the fact that these corporations
are organized under the laws of a third country which suffers when the
United States regulates that third country's concerns.
Section 403 of the Restatement essentially sets forth a balancing test to
determine if jurisdiction is valid under section 402. Limits on jurisdiction
can be made subject to the interest of another country.7 In essence, the
regulating state must weigh its interest against those of a country which may
suffer damage to its sovereignty by regulation. If the other country's interest
is of prevailing importance, then the regulating nation should defer to that

69 For a discussion of the requirements of these sections of the Restatement, and for the
language of the same, see supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
70 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 402(1) (a) & (b) (1986).
71 For discussion of the Restatement section 403, see supra note 34 and accompanying
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nation."
2. Violations of the U.N. Charter
The U.N. Charter clearly reserves, among all members, absolute sovereignty for every nation of the world.73 It is a basic idea of international law
that a state is free to govern within its borders without interference from the
outside.74 The Charter also clearly removes purely domestic laws from the
United Nations." There is obvious tension inherent in a series of laws
which are of domestic concern but have an impact outside of that state's
borders. This is the nature of the Cuban embargo.
The United States is certainly justified in its position that it can choose
those nations with which it wishes to trade. In this most basic sense, the
embargo is a valid exercise of national sovereignty. The character that the
embargo has taken in the years since its inception has, however, removed it
from this valid exercise of sovereignty. These strongarm tactics by the
United States serve as simple attempts to apply U.S. laws extraterritorially.
3. Violations of GAIT
The GAT' agreement specifies that signatory nations will not interfere
with the free flow of trade of other member nations.76 These measures
specifically apply to any action of member nations that restricts the flow of
trade of another member nation in any manner.' There is no question that
the U.S. measures violate these provisions.
The U.S. measures which impact third countries are especially suspect.
For example, the CDA restricts docking third country ships in U.S. ports
within 180 days of having previously been docked in Cuba.78 This measure
serves as a restriction on the free trade of third countries which would

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403 (1986).
73 See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text for a brief discussion concerning the

contents of the U.N. Charter.
74 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 401 (1986).
75 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
76 GATT, supra note 32, at art. 5.
77 See supra note 50 and accompanying text for specific discussion of the GATT
provisions which are especially germane to the Cuban trade embargo.
7' 22 U.S.C. § 6005(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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otherwise take advantage of Cuba's close proximity to the United States.7 9
Trade certainly does not flow freely in this situation, and such a disruption
of the free flow of trade clearly suggests a prima facie violation of
GATT.80

Until recently, the United States has maintained that its actions against
Cuba have been justified under Article XXI of the GATT treaty, 1 which
specifically exempts member nations from compliance with provisions of the
treaty in light of potential threats to national security. As a result of the end
of the Cold War, the United States is no longer justified in claiming such an
exemption from GATIT provisions under Article XXI. It is difficult to
escape the conclusion that the United States is violating the treaty.
C. U.N. Measures
The United Nations responded to the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba by
passing resolutions 47/19 and 48/16. g2 The resolutions renounced the
embargo as violating international law, 3 but the resolutions have no
binding effect on member nations." As such, the resolutions do little more
than put the world on notice while sounding a call for support for Cuba.

79 It is very likely that a country which trades with Cuba, despite the voluminous United
States measures which would potentially impact that country, would send a ship to the United
States after it had delivered goods to Cuba. The Cuban island is less than 100 miles from the
Florida keys.
so In addition to the restrictive measures of CDA, an entire spectrum of American
regulations also impose upon third countries identical deleterious effects. For example, any
entity organized under the laws of a third country which is tied to the United States through
shareholders (a 25% interest in the company is sufficient to trigger the embargo) is prohibited
from trading with the Cubans. Enforcement of these measures, if instigated, could result in
the U.S. entity being penalized as if it had violated the trade embargo. See 31 C.F.R. §§
515.559, 515.329, & 515.302. These measures certainly reach well beyond the borders of the
United States. For example, when a British company that is organized, chartered, and taxed
under British law is fined by the U.S. government because of trade with Cuba (an activity
which is freely permitted by the British government), Britain's sovereignty is breached.
s1 GATr, supra note 32, at art. 5.
'2 GA. Res. 48/16, and GA. Res. 47/19, supra note 1.
3 id.
84 Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
While a country such as the United States has the right, under international
law, to choose its own trading partners and, by logical extension, to impose
an embargo against whichever country it wishes, this right is not entirely
without limit. Whenever an embargo infringes on a third country's
sovereignty, it is likely that the embargo violates international law. Careful
examination of different sources of law has revealed that the U.S. practice
of the Cuban trade embargo is contrary to both domestic and international
law.
The embargo is based on the Trading with the Enemy Act which, by its
very name, allows restrictions on trade with enemy countries. While Cuba
was once the enemy of the United States, the fall of Communism has
rendered Cuba nothing more than a harmless neighbor. Furthermore, TWEA
requires a crisis or national emergency. Because the embargo is based on
a decades-old declaration of national emergency linked to a Communist
threat, the TWEA application of the embargo is tenuous.
Notwithstanding the problems with the domestic origins of the embargo,
the embargo in practice violates the sovereignty of third countries through
the imposition of U.S. policy on their trade practices. As such, the embargo
violates the sovereignty principles set forth in the Restatement, the U.N.
Charter, and GATT.
The United Nations' call on member nations to avoid infringing upon the
sovereignty of other Member nations by way of trade practices was designed
to direct the United States to cease its actions against Cuba, namely those of
CDA and its regulatory restrictions of third countries. The U.N. vote clearly
signaled the international community's disdain for the U.S. trade embargo
against Cuba. The difficulty, however, remains in any effort to enforce the
U.N. mandate. The United States contributes more to the budget of the
United Nations than any other nation, 5 and often leads the charge in
asserting compliance with U.N. mandates abroad. The United Nations rarely
takes a position against the United States, its biggest benefactor, but the
resolutions condemning the Cuban trade embargo have sounded the alarm.
The U.S. measures against Cuba are, nevertheless, unlikely to come to an

5See BAsIc FACrS ABouT THE UNITED NATIONS, 22, 261-64 (1992) (outlining the U.N.
budget structure and noting that the United States contributes 25% of the U.N. budget, the
maximum allowable amount, and more than any other member).
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end absent some drastic change in Cuba's political structure. While Castro
is in power, it is unlikely that there will be any drastic change in the U.S.
posture toward Cuba.
Jerry W. Cain, Jr.

